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ARTICLES
CHURCH SCHISMS, CHURCH PROPERTY,
AND CIVIL AUTHORITY
CALVIN MASSEYt

When human relationships fail, litigation often ensues.
When those relationships are religious and doctrinal strife
produces factional division, courts are limited to secular criteria
to decide church property disputes. This sounds simple, but it is
not. While courts must use secular criteria to decide church
property disputes, there remains considerable uncertainty about
the permissible latitude of those secular principles.
The
uncertainty stems from the Supreme Court's attempt to honor
three principles that are in tension with one another:
(1) autonomous church governance, which the Court sees as an
aspect of the free exercise of religion; (2) the need to prevent civil
courts from deciding issues of religious doctrine, an aspect of the
ban on governmental establishments of religion; and
(3) preservation of state autonomy to decide how best to
accommodate these twin goals, an aspect of federalism. There
are three principal problems with this tripartite objective. First,
sometimes they conflict with each other. Second, and worse, this
framework fails to take into account adequately the interest of
individuals-united in local congregations of religious believersto exercise freely their religious beliefs. Finally, embedded in
this framework is a generally unrecognized potential violation of
the Establishment Clause. This Article seeks to expose these
problems, identify the unrecognized Establishment Clause
violation, and present an approach that better protects the
interest in religious freedom of local congregants while still
preserving autonomy of church governance and limiting civil
courts to adjudication of secular issues.
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The generally unrecognized Establishment Clause violation
is the provision by states of special advantages to hierarchical
churches that allow them unilaterally to impose trusts for their
benefit upon property held by local congregations. The approach
advocated in this Article is that when hierarchical churches
divide into factions, the principles of religious freedom embedded
in the religion clauses compel civil courts to recognize the
religious beliefs of a majority of the local congregation in deciding
which faction of the divided church is entitled to the use of the
local congregational property, absent some clear and wholly
secular indication that the local congregation has given control of
its property to the general church. The cost of this approach is a
slight reduction in the discretion of states to specify decision
rules for church property disputes, and a somewhat more
controversial reduction in the degree of deference that civil courts
should pay to internal church governance rules when churches
divide into factions as a result of religious schism.
The general issue is poised for judicial reexamination in light
of the incipient fracture of the Episcopal Church in the United
States, as litigation between the general church and its
secessionist elements has broken out in California and Virginiaand threatens to occur in Pennsylvania, Texas, and Illinois.' The
I This results from the steady division of the Episcopal Church into separate
elements. On December 4, 2008, various disparate elements of the Anglican
Communion, including four dioceses that have seceded from the Episcopal Church,
USA ("ECUSA" or "Episcopal" Church)-Pittsburgh, Fort Worth, San Joaquin
(California), and Quincy (Illinois)-formed the Anglican Church in North America.
See Laurie Goodstein, Episcopal Split as Conservatives Form New Group, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2008, at Al; Taylor Gandossy, Conservatives Form New Anglican
Church, CNN, Dec. 4, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008fUS/12/04/episcopal.split/
index.html;
Anglican
Church
in
North
America,
Our
Genesis,
http'//anglicanchurch.net/media/acna ourgenesisjune-2009.pdf (last visited Apr.
1, 2010). For more on the Anglican Church in North America, see Anglican Church
in North America, http://www.anglicanchurch.net (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). The
schismatic Anglican Church includes at least eight Episcopal parishes in Virginia
that previously disaffiliated from the ECUSA, and a Colorado parish that
disaffiliated in 2007. See Jean Torkelson, Parish Votes To Secede: Episcopal Church
Joins Breakaway Anglican Network, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Mar. 27, 2007, at 20; Bill
Turque & Michelle Boorstein, 7 Va. Episcopal Parishes Vote To Sever Ties; Same-Sex
Unions, Choice of Gay Bishop Spark Conservatives'Break from Church, WASH. POST,
Dec. 18, 2006, at A01. Three other parishes in California that left the ECUSA to
affiliate with the Anglican Church in Uganda also joined the new Anglican Church
in North America. See Larry B. Stammer, North Hollywood ParishIs Third To Leave
the Episcopal Church; Conservative Members Join a Growing Group of Dissidents
Who've Left the Denomination, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, at B1. In addition, the
dioceses of San Joaquin (California), Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania), Fort Worth (Texas),
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academic literature on the subject has focused on the need to
avoid civil involvement in religious doctrine, but has reflected
the Court's indeterminate doctrine by its lack of agreement
concerning either the use of neutral principles or deference to
internal church governance.2 There has been scant attention
paid to either the Establishment Clause problems that can occur
by such deference,3 or to the religious freedom interest of
individuals and local congregations when a church of which they
are a part has splintered into schismatic factions.4 Each of those
issues is presented in the context of the schism within the
Episcopal Church and is considered in detail in this Article.

and Quincy (Illinois) have joined the ACNA. Web sites of these dioceses may be
accessed at Anglican Diocese of Pittsburgh, http://www.pitanglican.org (last visited
Apr. 1, 2010), Anglican Diocese of San Joaquin, http:/www.dioceseofsanjoaquin.net
(last visited Apr. 1, 2010), Diocese of Quincy, http://dioceseofquincy.org/index.html
(last visited Apr. 1, 2010), and Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth,
http://www.fwepiscopal.orglindexl.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
The Diocese of South Carolina has an uneasy relationship with the ECUSA, because
the ECUSA refused to consent to the election of the Reverend Mark Lawrence as its
bishop. See Alan Cooperman, Episcopal Church Rejects S.C. Bishop; FailedElection
Raises Conservatives' Ire, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2007, at A03. Later, the ECUSA
relented and Bishop Lawrence has been installed as Bishop. See Dave Munday,
Episcopal Diocese's Bishop Approved; After 2 Elections, Lawrence To Be Consecrated
in Jan., POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Oct. 30, 2007, at B1.
2 See generally Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf- Church
Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the FirstAmendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291
(1980); Kathleen A. Brady, Religious Organizations and Free Exercise: The
SurprisingLessons of Smith, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1633; Ira Mark Ellman, Driven from
the Tribunal:JudicialResolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1378
(1981); Kent Greenawalt, Hands offt.7 Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts over
Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843 (1998); John H. Mansfield, The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72 CAL. L.
REV. 847, 858-68 (1984); William G. Ross, The Need for an Exclusive and Uniform
Application of "NeutralPrinciples"in the Adjudication of Church Property Disputes,
32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 263 (1987); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes:
Churches as Secular and Alien Institutions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 335 (1986); Louis
J. Sirico, Jr., The ConstitutionalDimensions of Church PropertyDisputes, 59 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1 (1981); Robert J. Bohner, Jr., Note, Religious Property Disputes and
Intrinsically Religious Evidence: Towards a Narrow Application of the Neutral
Principles Approach, 35 VILL. L. REV. 949 (1990); Michael William Galligan, Note,
JudicialResolution of lntrachurchDisputes, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 2007 (1983). But see
H. Oaks, Trust Doctrinesin Church Controversies, 1981 BYU L. REV. 805.
3 But see Greenawalt, supra note 2; Galligan, supra note 2.
4 Greenawalt considers these interests as factors in balancing deference to
internal church rules and application of neutral principles, but does not conceive of
them as constituting an independent aspect of the religious liberty protected by
either or both of the religion clauses. See Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 1902-04.
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Part I describes the varied nature of church organizations
and the development of the constitutional doctrine that limits
civil court involvement in the resolution of church property
disputes. Part II explores the religious freedom interests of
individuals and local congregations under conditions of religious
division, using a Virginia statute that deals with this issue as the
lens by which to examine the question. Part III assesses the
circumstances under which reliance on internal church
governance rules as the criterion for deciding church property
may constitute a violation of either of the religion clauses. Part
IV states the constitutional principles that should be applied to
church property disputes when churches divide into discrete
factions as a result of doctrinal disagreement.
I.

CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE

An understanding of church organizations is critical to
understanding the constitutional doctrine pertaining to
church property disputes and this Article's analysis of that
doctrine. Churches may be organized in either hierarchical or
congregational forms. A hierarchical church is composed of local
congregations, each of which "is but a subordinate member of
some general church organization in which there are superior
ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power
of control... over the whole membership of that general
organization."5 A congregational church is one in which the local
I Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 722-23 (1871). The Supreme Court
has also defined a hierarchical church as one "organized as a body with other
churches having similar faith and doctrine with a common ruling convocation or
ecclesiastical head." Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church,
344 U.S. 94, 110 (1952). Hierarchical churches can be further divided
into episcopal and presbyterian forms. An episcopal church has a ruling
prelate, subordinate bishops, and local churches under the control of these higher
church authorities. See The Episcopal Church, Church Governance, httpJ/www.
episcopalchurch.org/67608 ENGHTM.htm?menupage=59957 (last visited Apr. 1,
2010). Churches using this form of organization include the Roman Catholic Church
("Catholic"), the Episcopal Church, the Methodist Church ("Methodist"), and various
Eastern Orthodox churches. See, e.g., Economic Expert, Episcopalian Church
Governance, http'J/www.economicexpert.com/a/Episcopalian:church:governance.htm
(last visited Apr. 1, 2010); The People of the United Methodist Church, Structure &
Organization: Governance, httpJ/www.umc.org (follow Our Church hyperlink, then
follow Structure & Organization hyperlink, then follow Governance hyperlink)
(last visited Apr. 1, 2010). For example, the ECUSA has a Presiding Bishop as
its head, a number of bishops who preside over geographic subdivisions
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congregation "is strictly independent of other ecclesiastical
associations."6
The significance of these differing forms of church
organization to constitutional law was first highlighted in
Watson v. Jones,7 a case decided by the Supreme Court in 1871
under federal common law.'
During the Civil War, the
called dioceses, and local churches within each diocese. See The Episcopal
Church, Church Governance, httpJ/www.episcopalchurch.org/67608_ENGHTM.
htm?menupage=59957 (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). The ECUSA is governed by a
constitution and canons that are the product of the General Convention, an
assembly of Episcopal bishops and delegates from the dioceses of the ECUSA. See
Gregory Straub, The Episcopal Church, Introduction to the General Convention,
http://generalconvention.org/gc/introduction (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). The ECUSA
is part of the worldwide Anglican Communion, which recognizes the Archbishop of
Canterbury as the spiritual head of the church, but does not acknowledge that he
has any other governing authority. See HARTFORD INST. FOR RELIGION RESEARCH,
HARTFORD SEMINARY, Episcopal Church, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RELIGION AND

SOCIETY (William H. Swatos, Jr. ed., 1998), available at httpJ/hirr.hartsem.
edu/ency/Episcopal.htm; Archbishop of Canterbury, Roles & Responsibilities
Overview, httpJ/www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/105 (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
Presbyterian churches place authority in an ascending order of bodies, each
of which is composed by representatives of the laity and the clergy. Churches
using this form of organization include the several branches of the
Presbyterian Church in the United States and the Assemblies of God. See General
Council of the Assemblies of God, Our Form of Government, httpj/www.
ag.org/top/Aboutlstructure.cfin (last visited Apr. 1, 2010); Presbyterian Church in
America, A Brief History: Presbyterian Church in America, http://www.pcanet.
org/general/history.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). For example, the Presbyterian
Church is governed at the congregational level by a session, consisting of the clergy
and an elected group of lay elders, which in turn is governed by a presbytery,
consisting of the clergy and lay elders within a geographic area. See Economic
Expert, Presbyterian
Church Governance, httpJ/www.economicexpert.coml
a/Presbyterian:church:governance.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). The presbyteries
are joined in a synod and governed by a national assembly of clergy and laity. See
Presbyterian Church in America, supra. In general, the distinction between
episcopal and presbyterian hierarchical churches is not of importance to this Article.
6 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722. Congregational churches can and do affiliate
with other religious organizations, but they recognize no superior authority over the
affairs of the local congregation. Examples of this form of organization include the
various Baptist churches, Jewish synagogues, Quakers, the Church of Christ, and
the variety of Protestant evangelical, Pentecostal, or fundamentalist churches.
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679.
8 Because Watson was decided well before Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 (1938), the Court applied federal common law in accord with the principle of
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18-19 (1842), overruled by Erie Railroad Co., 304
U.S. at 79. Because neither of the religion clauses had then been made applicable to
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the decision of the
Court in Watson has no constitutional precedential value. The Free Exercise Clause
was first applied to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940),
and the Establishment Clause was first so applied in Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
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Presbyterian Church fractured over the issue of slavery and
preservation of the Union. The national church announced its
fealty to the Union and emancipation by declaring support of
slavery and secession to be heretical sin, but a majority of the
ruling elders of Louisville, Kentucky's Walnut Street
Presbyterian Church took the opposing view and claimed
ownership of the local property. The Supreme Court ruled that,
with respect to hierarchical churches such as the Presbyterian
Church,
whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these
church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the
legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and 9 as
binding on them, in their application to the case before them.
Though the Court adverted to "the full and free right to entertain
any religious belief' and noted that "[t]he law ...is committed to

the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect,"' ° it
founded its decision on principles of implied contract:
The right to organize voluntary religious associations.., and
to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions
of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical
government of all the individual members, congregations, and
officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who
unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent
to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would
be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such
religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions
could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed."
While the Court in Watson rejected the United Kingdom rulewhich requires civil courts to determine which of two contending
religious factions holds to "the true standard of faith in
the church organization"' 2 -it did not do so as a matter of
constitutional law. Thus, as recently as 1968, the Georgia
Supreme Court decided a church property dispute by ruling that
a local congregation of a hierarchical church held its property in
an implied trust for the benefit of the hierarchical church only so
9 Watson,

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.

'o

Id. at 728.

'1

Id. at 728-29.

12 Id.

at 727; see, e.g., Attorney General v. Pearson, 36 Eng. Rep. 135, 148-49
(Ch. 1817); Craigdallie v. Aikman, 3 Eng. Rep. 601, 607 (H.L. 1813) (appeal taken
from Scot.).
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long as the higher church continued to adhere "to its tenets of
faith and practice existing when the local church affiliated with
it." 3 Any "departure from.., such tenets is a diversion from the
trust, which the civil courts will prevent." 4 But this approach
was rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Presbyterian
Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church." The Court concluded that the First
Amendment "commands civil courts to decide church property
disputes without resolving underlying controversies over
religious doctrine."16 On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court
concluded that it could no longer use implied trust theory to
decide church property disputes, 7 and relied instead upon deeds
vesting title in the local congregation to decide the issue. 8
Ten years later, in Jones v. Wolf, 9 the Supreme Court
embraced this "neutral principles" doctrine, which holds that
courts may use secular criteria such as deeds, statutes dealing
with express and implied trusts, and internal church governance
rules to dispose of church property disputes.2 0
The Court
characterized the approach as one that "relies exclusively on
objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law,"2 '
but acknowledged that it might require "a civil court to examine
certain religious documents, such as a church constitution, for
language of trust in favor of the general church."2 2 When doing
so, the Court cautioned that "a civil court must take special
care to scrutinize the document in purely secular terms,"23 and
when "interpretation of the instruments of ownership would
require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then
the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by

13 Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. E. Heights Presbyterian Church, 159
S.E.2d 690, 695 (Ga. 1968), rev'd sub nom. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
14

Id.

393 U.S. 440.
Id. at 449.
17 Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. E. Heights Presbyterian Church, 167
S.E.2d 658, 659 (Ga. 1969).
18Id. at 659-60.
19 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
20 Id. at 600, 602 (internal quotations omitted).
'5

16

Id. at 603.
' Id. at 604.
23 Id.
21
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the authoritative ecclesiastical body." 24 Of equal importance,
however, was the Court's observation that states could adopt any
one of three approaches to church property disputes without
running afoul of the Establishment Clause. The Court cited with
approval a concurrence by Justice Brennan in Maryland &
Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc.,25 in which Justice Brennan summarized the
three approaches.
The first is the Watson method of deference to internal
church governance principles.
As applied to congregational
churches, property issues "must be determined by the ordinary
principles which govern voluntary associations."26 The local
congregation decides the issue, by either majority rule or by
vesting control of its property in a local governing body, a point
acknowledged by the court in Watson 27 and Justice Brennan in
Eldership.28 In the case of hierarchical churches, however,
whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these
church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the
legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as
binding on them, in their application to the case before them.29
But the Court in Jones v. Wolf expressly rejected the notion "that
the First Amendment requires the States to adopt a rule of
compulsory deference to religious authority in resolving church
property disputes, even where no issue of doctrinal controversy is
involved." 0
The second approach is the "neutral principles" method,
which relies upon formal evidence of title, as embodied in deeds,
trusts, wills, and "general principles of property law," providing
24

Id. (citing Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709

(1976)).
396 U.S. 367 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 725 (1871).
21 Id. The Court stated: "If the principle ...is that the majority rules, then the
numerical majority of members must control the right to the use of the property." Id.
But if there are "within the congregation officers in whom are vested the powers of
such control, then those who adhere to the.., organism by which the body is
governed are entitled to the use of the property." Id.
' 396 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that courts may "enforce the
property decisions made within a church of congregational polity 'by a majority of its
members or by such other local organism as it may have instituted for the purpose of
ecclesiastical government'" (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 724)).
2 Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.
3 Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 605 (1979) (emphasis added).
26
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that the application of those principles does not require secular
courts to decide issues of religious doctrine.3 ' Under this theory,
civil courts may look only at the formal title arrangements to
determine the owner of church property. If title to a church
building is vested in the local congregation, it does not matter
that the hierarchical church of which it is a part has declared in
its governing instruments that all local church property is held in
trust for the benefit of the hierarchical church, unless the local
congregation has expressly or impliedly created such a trust.2
The third "approach is the passage of special statutes
governing church property arrangements in a manner
that precludes state interference in doctrine. Such statutes
must... leave control of ecclesiastical policy, as well as doctrine,
to church governing bodies."33 The term "ecclesiastical polity" is
not self-defining. It may mean that church governing bodies are
entitled to determine who is a member of the church, or which
local congregations are members of a hierarchical church. Such a
reading does not vest any authority in states to enact laws
that empower a hierarchical church to assert control unilaterally
over local congregational property. While that is the most
straightforward meaning of "ecclesiastical polity," the term could
be stretched to include the power of a hierarchical church
unilaterally to determine who owns the property of local
congregations that are part of it.
However, if that more
expansive meaning is given to "ecclesiastical polity," a question
arises of whether state laws vesting hierarchical churches with
that power violate the Establishment or Free Exercise Clauses.3 4
For the sake of clarity, this Article uses the term "secular
principles" to describe the general requirement that a civil court
may not decide issues of religious doctrine to adjudicate
entitlement to church property. Secular principles require that
Eldership, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Presbyterian
Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 449 (1969)).
32 Canon 1.7.4 of the Episcopal Church USA so provides: "All real and personal
property held by or for the benefit of any Parish, Mission or Congregation is held in
trust for this Church and the Diocese thereof in which such Parish, Mission or
31

Congregation is located." THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, CONSTITUTIONS AND CANONS tit.

I, canon 7, sec. 4 (The Archives of the Episcopal Church ed., Church Publishing Inc.
2006) (1789), available at http-//www.episcopalarchives.orge-archives/canons/
CandCFINAL_1l.29.2006.pdf.
Eldership, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring).
See infra Part III.
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any one of the three approaches sanctioned by Jones v. Wolf
eschew any inquiry into, or reliance upon, church doctrine as a
basis for decision of the property issues.
Even though Jones v. Wolf represented a commitment to
secular principles to decide church property issues, the case left
many questions unanswered. Under what circumstances may a
state mandate deference to religious authority? To what extent
may a state ignore or displace the internal rules of a hierarchical
church? Other than adherence to secular criteria for decision,
what limits, if any, do the religion clauses place on statutes that
a state may adopt to decide church property disputes?
As may be expected, courts are divided on their answers to
these questions.
Some courts have applied a principle of
compulsory deference to the internal rules of a hierarchical
church. 5 Others have applied neutral principles in a fashion
that takes account the internal governance of a hierarchical
church, producing outcomes no different from those reached by
courts that have mandated deference to internal church rules. 6
Some courts have applied an amalgam of neutral principles and
deference to internal governance rules.
Some courts have
applied neutral principles without any deference to the internal
governance of hierarchical churches. 8 Other courts have held
11 See, e.g., Episcopal Church Cases, 61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 894-95 (Cal. Ct. App.
2007), affd on different grounds, 198 P.3d 66, 84 (Cal. 2009); Episcopal Diocese of
Mass. v. DeVine, 797 N.E.2d 916, 918-19 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003); Bennison v. Sharp,
329 N.W.2d 466, 474 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Tea v. Protestant Episcopal Church in
the Diocese of Nev., 610 P.2d 182, 184 (Nev. 1980); Protestant Episcopal Church in
the Diocese of N.J. v. Graves, 417 A.2d 19, 24 (N.J. 1980); Presbytery of Seattle, Inc.
v. Rohrbaugh, 485 P.2d 615, 619 (Wash. 1971) (en banc). Under California Rules of
Court 8.1105(e), the California Supreme Court ordered the Court of Appeal's opinion
in Episcopal Church Cases "de-published-an Orwellian practice that prevents
attorneys from citing the opinion in their briefs or arguments. See CAL. R. CT.
8.1105(e).
36 See, e.g., Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 79-81 (Cal. 2009); In re
Church of St. James the Less, 888 A.2d 795, 807-10 (Pa. 2005); Guardian Angel
Polish Nat'l Catholic Church of L.A., Inc. v. Grotnik, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 552, 560 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2004); Korean United Presbyterian Church of L.A. v. Presbytery of the Pac.,
281 Cal. Rptr. 396, 405-10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Bishop & Diocese of Colo. v. Mote,
716 P.2d 85, 99-100 (Colo. 1986).
11 See, e.g., Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of Trinity-St. Michael's Parish, Inc. v.
Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Conn., 620 A.2d 1280, 1284-85 (Conn. 1993).
' See, e.g., Cal.-Nev. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church v. St.
Luke's United Methodist Church, 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 442, 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004);
Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of L.A. v. Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541,
549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Presbytery of Riverside v. Cmty. Church of Palm Springs,
152 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
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that deference to internal governance should occur only with
respect to doctrinal or ecclesiastical matters, but not to property
disputes.3 9
Finally, a few courts have concluded that a
hierarchical church can be hierarchical as to ecclesiastical and
40
doctrinal matters, but congregational as to church property.
This welter of doctrines has come sharply into focus in recent
years as the Episcopal Church of the United States fractures,
and various parishes and dioceses secede from the American
branch of the worldwide Anglican Communion 41 and associate
with more doctrinally congenial units of the Anglican
Communion. The Episcopal Church has been aggressive in its
resort to litigation to retain control of the church buildings and
related property of the parishes and dioceses that prefer new
Litigation in
connections within the Anglican Communion.
Virginia and California may well provide the United States
Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the constitutional
law applicable to this issue. This Article uses the present
litigation in Virginia and California as a lens to clarify the scope
of the secular principles doctrine.

"9See, e.g., Bjorkman v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 759 S.W.2d 583, 585-86
(Ky. 1988); cf Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.3d 699, 711-12 (4th Cir. 2002) (deferring to
internal governance on the question of whether an Episcopal rector was duly
qualified so to act).
40 See, e.g., Fire Baptized Holiness Church of the Americas, Inc. v. McSwain, 518
S.E.2d 558, 560 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999); Looney v. Cmty. Bible Holiness Church, 405
S.E.2d 811, 813-14 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). Furthermore, in Justice Schreiber's dissent
in Graves, he advocated examination of church governance documents to decide
where the "locus of control" should reside in the event of religious schism. Graves,

417 A.2d at 27-29 (Schreiber, J., dissenting). To that extent, Justice Schreiber
reverted to a rule of deference to internal governance. See id.
41 The Anglican Communion is an association of separate churches, each having

historical and liturgical roots in the Church of England. The Archbishop of
Canterbury, head of the Church of England, exercises no governance authority over
the individual churches composing the Anglican Communion, but is regarded as the
spiritual leader of the Anglican Communion. See Anglican Communion Office, The
Anglican Communion Official Website, http'//www.anglicancommunion.org/
communionlindex.cfm (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
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VIRGINIA: A STATUTORY PREFERENCE FOR CONGREGATIONAL
CHOICE

Virginia has adopted a statute directing courts how to decide
church property disputes when churches divide into contending
factions. As applied to hierarchical churches,42 the law provides
that,
[ilf a division has... occurred or shall... occur in a
church.., to which any. . congregation whose property is
held by trustees is attached, the members of such congregation
over 18 years of age may, by a vote of a majority of the
whole number, determine to which branch of the church...
such congregation
shall thereafter belong.
Such
determination. . . shall be conclusive as to the title to and
control of any property held in trust for such congregation ....
This provision is intended to give local congregations the power
to choose the branch of a divided hierarchical church with which
it wishes to affiliate. The first issue that the statute presents to
the civil courts is to decide whether there has been a division
within the hierarchical church. The resolution of that issue does
not turn on endorsement or examination of any religious
doctrinal principles. Rather, it can be decided by review of
empirical evidence of the existence of factions within the
hierarchical church. That is precisely what the Virginia trial
court did in ruling in 2008 that the Episcopal Church had divided
into two factions.4 Faced with evidence of secession of a growing
number of Episcopal parishes from the ECUSA,4 5 the wholesale
secession of one entire diocese,46 and the pending secession of at

42 Baber v. Caldwell, 152 S.E.2d 23, 26 (Va. Ct. App. 1967) (holding that the
quoted provision applies to hierarchical churches).
4

VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A) (2009).

4

In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal Church Prop. Litig., 76 Va. Cir. 785, 868-72

(Cir. Ct. 2008).
45 At the time of the Virginia trial court ruling, at least eight Episcopal parishes
in Virginia have disaffiliated from the ECUSA. See Turque & Boorstein, supra note
1. At least one Colorado parish had also disaffiliated from its local diocese and the
ECUSA. See Torkelson, supra note 1. Three parishes in California had also left the
ECUSA to affiliate with the Anglican Church in Uganda. See Stammer,
supra note 1.
I At the time of the Virginia trial court ruling, the Diocese of San Joaquin
(California) had voted to affiliate with the Anglican Province of the Southern Cone
(Latin America). See Neela Banerjee, Episcopal Diocese Votes To Secede from
Church, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2007, § 1, at 34. The web site of the disaffiliated, San
Joaquin diocese is at http'/www.dioceseofsanjoaquin.net/.
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least three more dioceses,4 7 the fact of division was strong.
Moreover, because the ECUSA asserts that it is spiritually
governed-if not otherwise-by the Archbishop of Canterbury,
the ruling prelate of the worldwide Anglican Communion, the
division within that Communion is even more palpable.
Disagreement over doctrine between the African and South
American Episcopal Churches, on the one hand, and the North
American and British Episcopal Churches, on the other hand,
has created a global rift within the Anglican Communion. 48 The
North American disaffiliations did not occur in a vacuum, for
each of the seceding units of the ECUSA did not leave the
worldwide Anglican Communion, but initially affiliated with
either the African or South American branches of the Anglican
Communion.
Of course, after the creation of the Anglican
Church of North America, these dioceses and congregations have
united in a new branch of worldwide Anglicanism. Inquiry by
the Virginia civil courts into these matters involved no inquiry
into doctrine, but only into the observable, wholly secular,
question of whether the Anglican Communion and the ECUSA
had divided into factions.
The reasons for the division 49 were legally irrelevant because
the neutral principles approach commands courts to be
47 At the time of the Virginia trial court ruling, the Episcopal Dioceses of
Pittsburgh, Fort Worth (Texas), and Quincy (Illinois) were all poised to disaffiliate
from the ECUSA. See Episcopal Diocese of Pittsburgh Changes Constitution, Joins
Anglican Province, TRINITY, Oct. 4, 2008, at 4; Sean D. Hamill, Episcopaliansin
Pittsburgh Vote To Leave U.S. Church, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at A23. Since then,
these dioceses and other disaffiliated units of the ECUSA have formed a new
Anglican unit: the Anglican Church in North America. See supra note 1.
" See, e.g., John F. Burns, Anglicans To Seek Pact To Prevent a Schism, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008, at A6; Laurie Goodstein, Conservative Anglicans Plan Rival
Conference as Split over Homosexuality Grows, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, at A6. Of
course, the schism discussed in these articles has become a tangible reality in North
America. See supra note 1.
49 Though portrayed in the media as a split over homosexual clergy and the
blessing of same-sex unions, the division has been occasioned by complex differences
of religious doctrine. In brief, the Episcopal Church maintains that Christ's message
must be interpreted in light of contemporary experience, and asserts that belief in
Christ's work is not the exclusive path to salvation. These doctrines have the
practical effect of, among other things, permitting ordination of women, consecration
of homosexual clergy and bishops, and the blessing of same-sex marriages. Almost
all Episcopal churches in the Anglican Communion outside of North America and
Europe reject these notions as inconsistent with their view of Christian faith. A
useful summation of the doctrinal divisions is contained in a statement by the
Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth, Texas: "[Wie are contending for the
faith." Bishop Jack Iker, Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth, Tx., Address to the
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indifferent to disputed church doctrine. Yet, civil courts cannot
remain indifferent to the fact of disputed claims of ownership,
and the Virginia statute displaces hierarchical church decisions
about ownership in favor of local congregational choice. The
Virginia statute thus raises the question of whether
it impermissibly interferes with the Episcopal Church's
ecclesiastical polity. The leading Supreme Court cases dealing
with state interference with ecclesiastical polity suggest that
Virginia has not offended the religious freedom of the Episcopal
Church by directing its courts to award local church property to
the majority faction of each local congregation when the
hierarchical church of which each congregation is a part has
divided into discrete and separate elements.

In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
Church,50 the Supreme Court ruled that the Free Exercise Clause
was violated by a New York statute, enacted after the Bolshevik
Revolution, which expressly transferred control of Russian
Orthodox churches in New York from the mother church in
Russia to the governing ecclesiastical authorities of the Russian
Orthodox Church in the United States. 5 The issue was the right
to use the cathedral; the Court acknowledged that title was
indisputably in the name of the American church. The Court
reasoned as follows:
Legislation that regulates church administration, the operation
of the churches, the appointment of clergy, by requiring
conformity to [specified] church statutes ... prohibits the free
exercise of religion. Although this statute requires the New
York churches to "in all other respects conform to, maintain and
follow the faith, doctrine, ritual, communion, discipline, canon
law, traditions and usages of the Eastern Confession (Eastern
Orthodox or Greek Catholic Church)," their conformity is by
legislative fiat and subject to legislative will. Should the state
assert power to change the statute requiring conformity to
ancient faith and doctrine to one establishing a different
doctrine, the invalidity would be unmistakable.5 2
Diocese of Ft. Worth (Nov. 15, 2008), http'//www.virtueonline.orgportal/modules/
news/article.php?storyid=9355.
50 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
"' Id. at 106-07.

Id. at 107-08 (emphasis added). While Kedroff dealt only with legislative
action of New York, eight years later the Supreme Court applied the same principles
to judicial action. In Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 190-91
(1960), the Court reversed a New York judgment that stripped the Moscow-based
52
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Although the Court in Kedroff proclaimed that "[fireedom to
select the clergy ...[has] federal constitutional protection as a
part of the free exercise of religion,"5 3 the case was mostly about
New York's mandated transfer of control of a specified
hierarchical church from one governing body to a different oneas well as the state's command that the statutorily preferred
governing body conform to specified church rules. The principle
for which Kedroff properly stands is that states may not
command churches to alter their hierarchical arrangements,
conform to specified religious doctrines, or to accept as clergy
those persons stipulated by the state.
The Virginia division statute, however, does not command
transfer of control of a specified hierarchical church from one
governing body to a different one. Nor does it require a church,
or a congregational unit of a church, to conform to any specified
church statutes. Rather, the Virginia law operates only when a
hierarchical church has itself become internally divided and,
even then, the law does not order transfer of control, but
establishes a process allowing the church members to decide
which branch better serves their religious needs. Unlike the
New York law at issue in Kedroff, in no sense does the Virginia
law stipulate any religious doctrine to which the divided church
is compelled to adhere.
Although it might be argued that the Virginia statute
"regulates church administration, the operation of the churches,
[and] the appointment of clergy,"5 4 this objection fails for two
reasons. First, the manner in which such interference occurs,
if at all, is produced by the intervening independent decision of
parishioners, and then only after the church has lapsed into
factional division. Unlike Kedroff, where the state directly
regulated church administration, church operation, and clergy
appointment, these effects are produced under the Virginia law
by religious adherents, not by the state. Of course, it is true that
parishioners might not be able to produce these effects without
the presence of the Virginia law, but that fact merely brings into
focus the second reason.

head of the Russian Orthodox Church of control of the Cathedral and vested control
in the United States-based governing authorities of the Russian Orthodox Church.
Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116.
Id. at 107.
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The core values of free exercise of religion are absolute
protection of religious belief and a presumption of invalidity
of state action that singles out religious conduct for
disadvantageous treatment. In Kedroff, the Court viewed New
York's mandate as interfering with the free exercise of religion.
But with whose freedom did New York interfere? New York did
not interfere with the free exercise of religious belief or conduct
of the members of the Russian Orthodox Church in America.
New York interfered with the internal governance autonomy of
the hierarchical church. The Court in Kedroff could just as easily
have grounded its decision on the Establishment Clause, because
by directing the transfer of control of the Russian Orthodox
Church in New York, the state was literally establishing a new
hierarchical church in lieu of the prior one.
While that
establishment was not the creation of a state religion to which all
citizens were forced to adhere to, it was a state establishment of
an American Russian Orthodox Church. Yet, the Kedroff Court
chose to rest its rationale on free exercise. In doing so, however,
it did acknowledge that there was "no schism over faith or
doctrine between the Russian Church in America and the
Russian Orthodox Church."5 5 This is a critical difference.
When religious schism is present, free exercise values have
two dimensions, which are in tension with one another.
Hierarchical churches are entitled to freedom from state
interference in their internal governance, but individuals and
local congregations are equally entitled to choose the branch
of their faith to which they wish to adhere. The Virginia statute
seeks to accommodate each of those goals by leaving a divided
hierarchical church free to create its own doctrinal and
governance rules, so long as those rules do not impede the
equally valid freedom of local congregations to honor their branch
of the faith. The free exercise of religion is overwhelmingly an
individual freedom; it becomes an institutional freedom only
when the state takes command of a church, as in Kedroff, or
when the state engages in "religious gerrymandering" 6 by a law
that is designed "to burden or favor selected religious
denominations." 57 To allow the internal governance rules of a
Id. at 120.

Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982) (quoting Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437, 452 (1971)).
57

Id.
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divided hierarchical church to deprive a local congregation of its
religious home-should it choose the branch of the faith
disfavored by the original hierarchical church-is utterly to
ignore the practical reality of free exercise of religion by that
community of individuals.
Of course, the local congregants who disagree with the
general church are always free to leave that church and create a
new religious congregation. But this ignores several salient
realities. First, from the perspective of the local congregants,
their religious community is primarily that which gathers in the
local church. This is not merely a social bond; religious belief
almost always entails some form of communal worship. Second,
and perhaps even more relevant to church property issues, is the
fact that in many hierarchical churches, the local congregations
are financed entirely through the voluntary contributions of the
local members, and those voluntary contributions are taxed by
the hierarchical church for its benefit.5" Moreover, the buildings
in which local communities worship have often been acquired
through local contributions and, in virtually every case, the
buildings are maintained through the voluntary largesse of the
local members. When schism occurs, reflexive delivery of these
properties to the hierarchical church flatly ignores the profound
interest in religious freedom of the local assembly. Without the
buildings and grounds which they have either purchased or
5 In Bjorkman v. ProtestantEpiscopal Church, 759 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1988), the
Kentucky Supreme Court attached weight to the fact that St. John's, the seceding
parish of the national Episcopal Church,
acquired the property with no assistance from [the Episcopal
Church]; ... the property was managed and maintained exclusively by St.
John's;... St. John's improved and added to its property; and that [the
Episcopal Church] deliberately avoided acquisition of title or entanglement
with the property to ensure that it would not be subject to civil liability.
Id. at 587. Moreover, in the ECUSA, some portion of the contributions made by local
parishioners are taxed by the general church for its support, so local members
provide all the financial support for their local community, as well as provide a
subsidy to the general church. See EPISCOPAL DIOCESE OF WASH., CONSTITUTION
AND CANONS 24 (2006) (stipulating that assessments are to be imposed upon each
diocese for the support of the national church). Similarly, each diocese imposes upon
local congregations the obligation to provide financial support to the diocese. See,
e.g., THE CONSTITUTION & CANONS OF THE CONVENTION OF THE PROTESTANT
EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF THE DIOCESE OF WASH., ET AL., CONSTITUTION AND CANONS,

pt. V, at 41 (Supp. 2007), available at httpJ/www.edow.org/diocese/governance/
constandcanons2007.pdf (outlining the Operating Budget of the Diocese in Canon
30, and the Support of the Diocesan Operating Budget by Congregations in Canon
31).
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maintained at their own expense, these communities may well
wither and die. A local congregation's freedom to choose which
branch of a divided church to which it will adhere is hollow
without access to its church property.
The Virginia statute protects this interest without
interfering with the internal church governance of a hierarchical
church.
First, the Virginia statute only applies when a
hierarchical church has divided into two factions. To defer to
internal governance rules of a hierarchical church that would
keep control of local church property in the general church is
to favor one branch of a divided church at the expense of the
other, and to ignore completely the religious views of local
congregations that have chosen to ally themselves with the other
branch of the sundered church.
Deference under these
circumstances amounts to a governmental sectarian preference of
the sort condemned by the Supreme Court in Larson v. Valente.5 9
Second, deference to internal church governance as
a criterion for resolution of church property disputes was
originally justified in Watson as founded on implied contract. 60
As the Court put it in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
of Manila,6 1 local congregants have chosen "by contract
or otherwise"6 2 to surrender ecclesiastical control of their
congregations to the general church. This may be an adequate
explanation of the state of affairs when a hierarchical church
chooses to close a local church or replace a much-loved priest or
minister with a new and unwelcome one, but it will not serve
when the general church has fractured into separate elements.
Under schismatic circumstances, permitting the original
hierarchical church to drive its members out of their halls of
worship is to deny to those individuals an essential element of
their exercise of religion. Their implied contract was with one
hierarchical church. When that singular church divides, amoebalike, there is no longer any contractual or other obligation that
can trump individual and congregational decisions of religious
conscience. Virginia recognizes this by permitting members of
the hierarchical church to choose individually which branch of
'9 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
0 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871) ("All who unite themselves
to [a hierarchical church] do so with an implied consent to this government, and are
bound to submit to it.").
61 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
82 Id. at 16.
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the doctrine they believe, and as a local community of faith, to
choose which branch will be honored in their building. Someone
must lose when churches divide, and church property is not
susceptible to division in kind. Virginia's solution does not
require courts to delve into doctrine or interfere with church
governance or polity, but it does act to preserve the individual
element of religious belief in the most relevant context in which
that individual faith is manifested by communal worship.
Nor does Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich6 3
lend support to the idea that the Virginia division statute might
impermissibly interfere with ecclesiastical polity. After the
highest governing body of the Serbian Orthodox Church, a
hierarchical church, suspended Milivojevich as bishop of its
North American diocese and split the diocese into three parts,
Milivojevich sued the church, contending that the suspension
and diocesan reorganization violated internal church rules.6 4
The Illinois Supreme Court held the church's actions to be
invalid because the removal was arbitrary and the reorganization
did not conform to the church's internal governance rules.65 The
United States Supreme Court reversed. 66
The question of
removal of a bishop was a canonical act, and an earlier case,
Gonzalez,67 held that "[in the absence of fraud, collusion, or
arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on
matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are
accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive,
because the parties in interest made them so by contract or
otherwise."6
Though the Illinois court concluded that the
bishop's removal was arbitrary because it violated the church's
laws, the Supreme Court reasoned that judicial analysis of
whether the ecclesiastical actions of a church judicatory
are... "arbitrary" must inherently entail inquiry into the
procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law... requires the
church judicatory to follow, or else in to the substantive criteria

65

426 U.S. 696 (1976).
See id. at 697-98.
See id. at 698.

6

See id.

6

67
6

280 U.S. at 1.
Id. at 16.
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by which they are... to decide the ecclesiastical question. But
this is exactly
the inquiry that the First Amendment
69
prohibits ....
The Illinois court's conclusion that the mother church's
reorganization of the diocese into three subdivisions was ultra
vires was also reversed. The Illinois court had impermissibly
"substituted its interpretation of the Diocesan and Mother
Church constitutions for that of the highest ecclesiastical
tribunals in which church law vests authority to make that
interpretation" since "the reorganization of the Diocese involves a
matter of internal church government, an issue at the core of
ecclesiastical affairs." 0 Quoting Kedroff, the Court reiterated
"that religious freedom encompasses the 'power (of religious
bodies) to decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine.' "71
The critical difference between Gonzalez, Kedroff, and
Serbian Orthodox, on one hand, and the Virginia division statute,
on the other, is that each of these cases rejected civil judicial
interference in the internal ecclesiastical affairs of a hierarchical
church, but did not deal with the quite different issue of the
status of church property following a doctrinal schism within
such a church. The Virginia statute does not dictate how clergy
are to be appointed or removed, what the composition of dioceses
or other internal units of the church should be, or which faction
is entitled to claim the mantle of the church. Rather, the
Virginia statute responds to the inherent duality of religious
freedom in the context of a religious schism. Religious belief is
both individual72 and collective.7 3
The collective aspect of
'9Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713.

Id. at 721.
11Id. at 721-22 (quoting Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox
70

Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952)).
72

Justice William 0. Douglas once noted that "[rieligion is an individual

experience." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). A
staple of Protestant theology is the idea that individuals have a personal
relationship with God. An example of this belief is this explanation from the Central

Presbyterian Church of Towson, Maryland, on how to become a Christian: One must
accept "a personal relationship to God through Jesus Christ." See Central
Presbyterian Church, Becoming a Christian, http'/www.centralpc.org/new to

central/becoming_achristian (last visited Apr. 1, 2010). Yet, alongside that principle
lies the notion that believers are united in one body. As the Nicene Creed, a

statement of faith used in the Episcopal liturgy, puts it: "M

believe in
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religious faith requires that religious organizations be free of
state interference in matters of doctrine and arrangement of the
ecclesiastical polity. The individual aspect of religious faith
requires that individuals be free to choose the communities with
which they worship. The Virginia statute is aimed precisely at
the line between these two principles. A hierarchical church is
free to pronounce doctrine, select clergy, organize, and govern
itself free of state interference. But when a hierarchical church
divides into doctrinal factions, Virginia announces a democratic
principle of majority vote of the individuals who compose each
worship unit to determine which faction will have possession and
use of the church property. So long as a hierarchical church
remains a single organization, the Virginia statute ignores it, but
once it chooses to divide, Virginia applies a neutral principle to
resolve the property dispute that is implicit in church schism.
Virginia's rule is unconcerned with the doctrinal reasons for the
rift. Moreover, by using majority vote at the congregational level
to decide the property dispute, Virginia protects the freedom of
religious choice of a majority of the individuals composing each
unit of property that is in dispute.
one ...

catholic and apostolic Church." NICHOLAS AYo, THE CREED AS SYMBOL 174

(1989).

73 Professor Douglas Laycock has written: "Religion includes important
communal elements for most believers." Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory
of the Religion Clauses: The Case of ChurchLabor Relations and the Right to Church
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (1981). Because "[tihey exercise their
religion through religious organizations,.... these organizations must be protected"
by the guarantee of free exercise of religion. Id. In a similar vein, Justice William
Brennan has asserted that "[flor many individuals, religious activity derives

meaning in large measure from participation in a larger religious community
[, which] represents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not
reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals." Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987)
(Brennan, J., concurring). Roman Catholic theology asserts that extra ecclesiam,
nulla salus (outside the Church, no salvation), a doctrine that is founded on the
belief that Christ and his church are indivisible-though Catholic doctrine holds
that literal membership in the Roman Catholic Church is not essential to salvation.
See generally THE HARPER COLLINS ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CATHOLICISM

1158-60

(Richard P. McBrien et al. eds., 1995). A recent statement of the doctrine by the
Vatican's Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith is found in Dominus Iesus. See
CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DECLARATION "DOMINUS IESUS"
ON THE UNICITY AND SALVIFIC UNIVERSALITY OF JESUS CHRIST AND THE CHURCH

(Aug. 6, 2000), available at http:l/www.vatican.va/roman-curia/congregations/
cfaith/documents/rc-concfaith doc20000806dominus-iesusen.html; see also Fr.
Ray Ryland, No Salvation Outside the Church, THIS ROCK, Dec. 2005, available at

httpJ/www.catholic.com/thisrock/2005/0512fea3.asp.
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A different subsection of the Virginia division statute applies
to congregational churches,7 4 and the validity of that subsection
is largely beyond cavil. v5 When a congregation has splintered
into factions, Virginia has chosen the third option that the Court
in Jones v. Wolf offered to states to resolve church property
disputes.
The statute does not interfere with ecclesiastical
affairs, but merely announces the eminently democratic principle
of majority rule to resolve property disputes that arise from
doctrinal schism. Of course, there can be problems in the
application of the statute to a congregational denomination. For
example, when division occurs within a congregation with no
written instrument that defines who is a member, and thus
entitled to vote, civil courts would be required to determine
membership by reference to actual practice of the congregation,
so long as that can be decided without delving into religious
doctrine. These problems, however, are administrative only, and
do not raise large questions of religious freedom under the
Constitution.

III. CALIFORNIA: WHEN MANDATORY DEFERENCE TO RELIGIOUS
GOVERNANCE VIOLATES RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

California's approach to church property disputes includes a
statute, Corporations Code Section 9142, that specifies the
conditions under which a charitable trust for religious purposes
will be found. In relevant part, the statute provides:
(c) No assets of a religious corporation are or shall be deemed to
be impressed with any trust, express or implied, statutory or at
common law unless one of the following applies:
(1) Unless, and only to the extent that, the assets were
received by the corporation with an express commitment by
74VA. CODE ANN.

§ 57-9(B) (2009) provides, in relevant part:
If a division has occurred... or shall.., occur in a congregation whose
property is held by trustees which, in its organization and government, is a
church or society entirely independent of any other church or general
society, a majority of the members of such congregation, entitled to vote by
its constitution as existing at the time of the division, or where it has no
written constitution, entitled to vote by its ordinary practice or custom,
may decide the right, title, and control of all property held in trust for such
congregation.

Id.

15 For further discussion of the problems
that exist with respect to the
application of statutes such as the Virginia division statute to congregational
churches, see supra text accompanying notes 49-58.
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resolution of its board of directors to so hold those assets in
trust.
(2) Unless, and only to the extent that, the articles or
bylaws of the corporation, or the governing instruments of a
superior religious body or general church of which the
corporation is a member, so expressly provide.
(3) Unless, and only to the extent that, the donor expressly
imposed a trust, in writing, at the time of the gift or
donation.
(d) Trusts created by paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) may be
amended or dissolved by amendment from time to time to the
76
articles, bylaws, or governing instruments creating the trusts.
This provision combines neutral principles with the special
statute approach suggested by the Court in Jones v. Wolf, but it
contains a serious defect that causes it, in some applications, to
constitute a forbidden establishment of religion. Because any one
of three methods specified by the statute can create a trust of a
local church's property in favor of the hierarchical church with
which it is affiliated, it is important to examine each of
the methods. The first is not constitutionally problematic, so
long as the directors resolve to hold the assets in trust for
the hierarchical church. Similarly, the third method is beyond
reproach, so long as the donor's express trust makes clear that
the trust is in favor of the hierarchical church. Even if there
were ambiguity in either of these cases, the neutral principles
approach would require a civil court to examine the terms of the
trust or its acceptance-so long as doctrinal inquiry is
unnecessary-to decide whether the trust is in favor of the
hierarchical church or the local congregation.
The second
method, however, is fraught with constitutional difficulties.
Under subsection (c)(2) of the California statute, a trust of
local church property in favor of a hierarchical church can be
created simply by an express declaration of that trust in the
"governing instruments of a superior religious body or general
church" of which a local church is a part. Subsection (d) provides
that such trusts may be amended or dissolved by mere
alteration of those governing instruments. Ordinary principles of
trust law do not contemplate creation of a trust by the unilateral
declaration of trust by the putative beneficiary. Thus, this
provision grants a unique benefit to hierarchical churches.
76

CAL. CORP. CODE § 9142 (2006).
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Government aid to religion violates the Establishment Clause
when it lacks a secular purpose or has as its primary effect the
advancement of religion.7 7
Phrased more positively, when
government aid "is entirely neutral with respect to
religion... [and] provides benefits directly to a wide spectrum of
individuals" 78 to accomplish secular goals, it does not violate the
Establishment Clause.7 9 By these provisions, California has
granted to hierarchical churches a benefit that is not made
available to other putative charitable trust beneficiaries. Only
hierarchical churches may impose a trust in its favor upon
property of a local affiliate. The Veterans of Foreign Wars, the
Rotary Club, or the Fraternal Order of Elks are not given this
power. On their faces, California Corporations Code sections
9142(c)(2) and 9142(d) are not neutral with respect to religion.
Yet, in the Episcopal Church Cases, ° the California Supreme
Court failed to discern the religious preference of Corporations
Code section 9142. First, that court fastened upon dicta in Jones
v. Wolf that "the constitution of the general church can be made
to recite an express trust in favor of the denominational
church... [a] nd the civil courts will be bound to give effect to the
8
result indicated by the parties.1
' The California court reflexively
relied on this passage to conclude that a hierarchical church can
unilaterally impress a trust in its favor of local congregational
property." It wholly ignored the important qualification in the
Jones v. Wolf dicta that the obligation of civil courts is to honor
"the result indicated by the parties."83 In simpler language, civil

"7 Despite repeated reports of the death of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971), its analytical approach remains as a template through which government aid
to religion is assessed for compliance with the Establishment Clause. See, e.g.,
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 669 (2002).
7 Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662.
7 See also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000) (plurality opinion)
(citation omitted) ("[If the government, seeking to further some legitimate secular
purpose, offers aid on the same terms, without regard to religion, to all who
adequately further that purpose... then it is fair to say that any aid going to a
religious recipient only has the effect of furthering that secular purpose.").
o 198 P.3d 66 (Cal. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen
of Saint James Parish in Newport Beach, Cal. v. Protestant Episcopal Church in the
Diocese of L.A., 130 S. Ct. 179 (2009).
81 Id. at 80 (emphasis removed) (quoting Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979)
(emphasis added)).
See id. at 83.
Id. at 80 (emphasis removed) (quoting Wolf, 443 U.S. aLt 606).
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courts must give effect to bilateral agreements, and a unilateral
declaration of trust by the putative beneficiary is not a bilateral
agreement.
The California Supreme Court accepted uncritically the
argument of the hierarchical church that was benefitted by
section 9142 that the secular goal of the statute is to avoid
conflict with the free exercise guarantee by providing a method
for resolving church property disputes that does not depend on
doctrinal inquiry and recognizes internal autonomy as an
aspect of the free exercise right of churches. s4 This justification
fails because California's method prefers hierarchical churches to
congregational churches, in violation of the Establishment
Clause. Larson v. Valente"5 held that statutes that "burden or
favor selected religious denominations" constitute "religious
gerrymandering" and are forbidden by the Establishment
Clause. 6 The clear effect and evident purpose of subsections
(c)(2) and (d) are to favor hierarchical churches. They enable
hierarchical churches, and no other churches, charitable
organizations, or non-charitable entities, to create trusts for their
benefit of property they do not own by mere declaration of the
trust.
Moreover, because California has created alternative ways to
accomplish its putative objective, there is even less reason to
view subsections (c)(2) and (d) as furthering any secular purpose
or having any neutral effect with respect to religion generally or
between denominations. Were subsections (c)(2) and (d) modified
to remove this benefit to hierarchical churches, such
churches would remain free to acquire beneficial title in local
congregational property. Of course, either of the other two
methods California provides for creation of trusts of local church
property for the benefit of the hierarchical church would require
consent of the donor or local congregations. This requirement,
however, is a general rule of conduct applicable to all citizens.
Ecclesiastical autonomy, which is the concern of Gonzalez,

IId. at 83 ("[Tlhe section... promotes the free exercise rights of persons to
form and join a religious association that is constructed and governed as they
choose.").
m 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
8

Id. at 254.
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Serbian Orthodox, and Kedroff, is not compromised by imposing
on hierarchical churches a rule which all persons must observe in
their quest to acquire property interests.
To similar effect is Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet, v in which the Court concluded that
New York legislation designed to permit an insular religious
community to operate a public school system that would consist
entirely of members of the religious community was "tantamount
to an allocation of political power on a religious criterion," and
thus violated the Establishment Clause. 8 California's decision to
grant hierarchical churches a unique authority to impress a
trust upon property they do not own merely by declaring that
the church is the trust beneficiary of that property is an even
more startling cession of governmental power to a religious
organization. This is not a mere veto over the ability of others to
obtain governmental benefits-as in Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc. 9 -but the far more extraordinary power to seize property by
divesting others of their beneficial interests in the property. 90
The California provisions also fail the scrutiny that Justice
Kennedy proposed in his Kiryas Joel concurrence.
For a
governmental accommodation of religion to be valid, the state
must seek "to alleviate a specific and identifiable burden"91 on
religion, the accommodation must "not impose or increase any
burden" on those who are not adherents to the accommodated
religion,9 2 and the state must not have denied other religions the
same benefit "under analogous circumstances."9 3 First, there is
no "specific and identifiable burden" on hierarchical churches
17

512 U.S. 687 (1994).

' Id. at 690.
89 459 U.S. 116, 125 (1982).
90 Although sections (c)(2) and (d) work no immediate dispossession of the local
congregation, and thus provide no solid basis for asserting that they constitute a
regulatory taking, once conflict erupts between the local congregation and the
general church over possession of the local church property, a civil court decision
granting possession to the general church based on sections (c)(2) or (d) would
constitute a permanent dispossession and, thus, a taking. See, e.g., Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that a cable
television company's permanent occupation of a landlord's property constitutes a
taking, even though the relevant New York statute required landlords to permit
cable installation).
9l Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 724 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
9

Id.

' Id. at 726.
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that subsections (c)(2) and (d) alleviate. Hierarchical churches
are free to utilize the more conventional, and less preferential,
methods of subsections (c)(1) and (c)(3) to place local church
property in trust for the benefit of the general church. Second,
the California provision imposes a burden on those who are not
adherents to the accommodated religion. Donors of property to
local churches are not necessarily members of the hierarchical
church. Such donors have no assurance that their intent to
transfer property in trust for the exclusive benefit of the local
church, and not the hierarchical church, will be honored. All the
general church would need to do is alter its own internal
governing instruments to nullify the explicit intentions of donors.
This is a unique and specific burden that would not exist but for
the California provisions.
Justice Kennard, concurring in the judgment, defended the
California provisions on the grounds that they incorporate the
Watson principle that civil courts should defer to a hierarchical
church's governance structure to adjudicate property disputes
within such a church.94 But this Watson principle holds that
governments may not inquire into, or interfere with, such
governance structures, not that governments may endow
hierarchical churches with unique powers that a church could not
create or obtain in the absence of government action. The New
York legislation voided in Kedroff, for example, was an attempt
to privilege a governance structure created by a schismatic
faction of the Russian Orthodox Church. Such insulation from
the pre-existing governance structure of the mother church could
not have been created without New York's intervention. Rather
than declaring a principle of neutrality with respect to the
governance of hierarchical churches, California's provisions
intervene in that governance by enabling hierarchical churches
to impose trusts in their favor without the consent of the
property owner.
Hierarchical churches contend that the California provision
does no more than recognize a common governance principle
of hierarchical churches, and in the Episcopal Church Cases
the California Supreme Court agreed.9 5 A condition of local
affiliation with the hierarchical church is that the local
94 See Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d 66, 85-86 (Cal. 2009) (Kennard, J.,
concurring).
91 See id. at 81-82.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84:23

congregation's property will be held in trust for the benefit of the
hierarchical church. For example, the ECUSA's Canon 1.7.4
provides that "[a]ll real and personal property held by or for the
benefit of any Parish, Mission or Congregation is held in trust for
this Church and the Diocese thereof in which such Parish,
Mission or Congregation is located."9 6 This may well constitute a
prerequisite for local affiliation with the higher church,9 v but
without secular action of the owners of that property to place it in
trust for the benefit of the higher church, the canon is hortatory.
To be sure, the existence of the canon might support the creation
of an implied trust in favor of the ECUSA, but this cannot be true
with respect to local churches that hold their property explicitly
in trust for the benefit of the local congregation. Something more
than the higher church's unilateral ukase is needed to convert an
explicit trust for the benefit of a local congregation into a trust
for the benefit of the hierarchical church with which the local
body is affiliated. That is where the California provision comes
in. It purports to vest in the hierarchical church the unilateral
power to convert property held for local congregational benefit
into property held in trust for its own benefit. As discussed, this
is both a form of denominational preference and a cession to a
church of secular authority, each of which is forbidden by recent
Supreme Court precedent. What is remarkable is that the courts
are so indifferent to these principles.9"
IV. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES, AND STATE
AUTONOMY
There is confusion concerning the proper standard for civil
resolution of church property disputes because in Jones v. Wolf,
the Supreme Court left three options for civil courts to choose
from to dispose of church property disputes. One solution is to
THE EPIsCOPAL CHURCH, supra note 32 (Organization and Administration of
Business Methods in Church Affairs: Property Held in Trust). This provision was
adopted by the ECUSA in 1979. See Episcopal Church Cases, 198 P.3d at 72.
Enactment of the canon was probably a reaction to the apparent invitation of Jones
v.Wolf.
7 For example, Canon 11.6.1 of the ECUSA, provides that no church "shall be
consecrated until the Bishop shall have been sufficiently satisfied that the building
and the ground on which it is erected are secured for ownership and use by a Parish,
Mission, Congregation, or Institution affiliated with this Church and subject to its
Constitution and Canons." THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, supra note 32, at tit. II, canon
6, sec. 1 (Worship of Dedicated and Consecrated Churches: Evidence of Affiliation).
98 See cases cited supra notes 35-37.
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settle upon a single standard, 99 but this approach pays
insufficient attention to the disparate nature of church
organizations, the variety of property arrangements that are
possible, and the delicate task of accommodating the religious
freedom of both church organizations and their constituent
elements, whether individuals or local assemblies of believers.
This multiplicity of factors suggests that flexibility is needed, but
clearer boundaries upon the exercise of flexibility are also
necessary. Each of the three options for resolution of church
property disputes that the Supreme Court identified in Jones v.
Wolf requires courts to use only secular criteria when reaching
a decision.
However, the options fail to account adequately
for either religious freedom or the need to avoid forbidden
establishments of religion. Uncritical reliance upon internal
church governance rules to resolve property disputes is the
principal problem. This issue has two facets.
First, while courts should defer to internal governance rules
in ecclesiastical matters-issues of religious doctrine or clerical
authority-the use of these rules to decide property disputes may
provide a constitutionally forbidden preference to hierarchical
churches. When hierarchical churches adopt internal rules that
permit them to acquire property without the consent of the
property owner, and those rules are enforced by civil courts, they
have obtained a governmental benefit not available to secular
charities or non-hierarchical churches. Second, under conditions
of religious schism, reliance upon internal church governance
rules places civil courts in the position of favoring one side of
a religious dispute. This is particularly true in the case of
hierarchical churches because the internal governance rules of
the original church will almost always favor that wing of the
schismatic church. Even more important is the fact that this
method of decision utterly fails to recognize the significant
interest in individual and collective choice of religious belief
that is manifested by the decision of a local congregation of a
schismatic hierarchical church to align with the wing of the
divided church that is disfavored by the original church. When
schism occurs, the religion clauses unite to require that local
congregational property goes with the choice of affiliation made
9 See, e.g., William G. Ross, The Need for an Exclusive and Uniform Application
of "Neutral Principles" in the Adjudication of Church Property Disputes, 32 ST.
LouIs U. L.J. 263, 316 (1987).
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by a majority of the local congregation. These principles will be
discussed in connection with each of the three options preserved
for civil courts by Jones v. Wolf.
A.

Deference to Internal Principlesof Church Governance

Under this approach, problems of differing magnitude occur
with respect to congregational churches and hierarchical
churches. Constitutional difficulties are present in either case,
but they are greater with respect to hierarchical churches.
1.

Congregational Churches

When congregational churches fracture, the property issues
that result are generally capable of resolution without significant
danger of civil intrusion into religious freedom. If such churches
have a written constitution-whether articles of incorporation or
some other written expression of a fundamental governance
structure-that document may be used to resolve the issue
unless, of course, control of the property under the constitutive
In
document turns on a resolution of religious doctrine.
such cases, resort to neutral principles such as formal title is
necessary.
Some congregational churches, especially those
that are unincorporated associations, do not have written
constitutive documents. In such cases, the state law concerning
unincorporated associations must be used to decide the property
issues. If majority rule is the state's rule, the customs of the
congregation should be used to decide who constitutes the voting
polity of the congregation; but conflict with religious doctrine can
occur when relying on congregational customs to determine who
constitutes the church polity.
As an example, imagine a congregational church that has
fractured over the issue of whether women should be permitted
to participate equally with men in the liturgical and governance
work of the church. The prior understanding of the congregation,
based on religious texts, has been that women should be silent
and passive participants in the church's liturgy and governance.
The church is an unincorporated association located in one of the
states that permits such associations to hold title to realty, and
either lacks any written constitutive document or operates under
a charter that fails to specify who may vote on governance
matters. Resort to congregational custom will cause the civil
court to side with one side in the doctrinal controversy.
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Of course, the relevant state law could stipulate that all
persons age eighteen or older who are members of the association
may vote. But this statutory provision would merely shift the
problem to the question of whether the statutory rule would
constitute an impermissible interference with ecclesiastical
polity. Application of the principle that civil courts must respect
equally the church's religious freedom and the individual
religious freedom manifested through a community of adherents
leads to the conclusion that the state's voting rule should prevail.
Absent contrary evidence, the state's rule should be presumed to
be crafted without either the intent or probable effect of favoring
one side in a doctrinal controversy. This would surely be the case
if the rule applied to all unincorporated associations, whether
religious or secular. This neutrality should insulate the state's
rule from attack as an impermissible interference with the
religious freedom of the congregation. The state's rule might
favor one side of the doctrinal split, but it would do so
unintentionally, as part of a rule generally applicable to
unincorporated associations. Moreover, it would preserve the
individual and communal religious freedom that is particularly
critical when congregations divide on points of religious belief. In
this example, a congregational church's religious freedom, as
distinguished from that of a hierarchical church, is subsumed
into the doctrinal preferences of its members.
2.

Hierarchical Churches

Hierarchical churches generally hold as a matter of religious
doctrine that the tenets of the faith are unitary and unvarying
across all elements of the church. The highest authority in such
a church generally articulates that doctrine. Thus, for example,
the Roman Catholic Church regards the Pope as the apostolic
successor to St. Peter, whom Jesus declared to be the "rock [upon
which] I will build my church." 10 0 Roman Catholic doctrine relies
upon the same Biblical passage to hold that Peter and his papal
successors have divinely sanctioned authority on Earth. 10 1 The
101 Matthew 16:18 (New International).
101Id. 16:19 ("I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven; whatever you

bind on earth will be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth will be
loosed in heaven."); see also George Joyce, The Pope, in THE CATHOLIC
ENCYCLOPEDIA 260, 260-61 (Charles G. Herbermann et al. eds., 1911), availableat
http'J/www.newadvent.org/cathen/12260a.htm.
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governance structure of the Roman Catholic Church is thus
intimately connected to its religious doctrine. Other hierarchical
churches may involve less fusion of governance and doctrine.
The ECUSA, for example, vests governance in a General
Convention consisting of bishops and elected deputies, and
charges the Presiding Bishop to speak "for the Church as to the
policies, strategies and programs authorized by the General
Convention, "1°2 and als to "[sipeak God's words.., as the
representative of this Church and its episcopate in its corporate
capacity."10 3 Because hierarchical churches consist of a multitude
of local congregations officiated by clergy who are ordained and
designated by and through the general church, conflict can
and does arise when doctrinal disagreements occur between the
general church and its constituent elements. Civil courts have no
authority to adjudicate doctrine, of course, but must adjudicate
the property issues that inevitably follow. There are several
situations in which these property issues can arise.
First, there may be congruence between the internal rules
of church governance and the manner in which title to the
local congregational property is held. For example, assume the
internal church rules declare that all local congregational
property is held in trust for the benefit of the general church, and
the secular title documents state the same thing. Civil court
deference to internal church governance rules poses no
constitutional difficulty because the same result would obtain if
the court were to apply the neutral principles approach.
A second scenario is conflict between deference to
internal rules of hierarchical churches that declare that local
congregational property is held in trust for the general church,
even though legal and beneficial title is held in favor of the local
congregation. When a majority of a local congregation decides
that its religious beliefs and the doctrine of the general church
are no longer compatible, and thus decides to separate from
the general church, a serious constitutional issue is presented.
On one hand, deference to internal church governance rules
recognizes the freedom of a hierarchical church to preserve itself
as an entity. But that perspective is myopic, as it wholly ignores
"m

THE EPIscOPAL CHURCH, supra note 32, at tit. I, cannon 2, sec. 4(a)(1) (Policy

and Strategy of the Chief Pastor and Primate).
11 Id. at sec. 4(a)(2) (Chief Pastor and Primate as Representative of Church and

Episcopate).
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the conflicting freedom of individuals gathered together in a local
worship community to preserve their own community of religious
belief. Assuming that the state has not acted to mandate
deference to hierarchical church governance, as California has
done by enacting California Corporations Code sections
9142(c)(2) and 9142(d), the constitutional problem presented is
whether judicial discretion to defer to hierarchical church
governance violates10 the
Establishment Clause as fully as does a
4
statutory mandate.
There are several problems with judicial resort to internal
church governance rules as the standard of decision. First,
although internal governance rules appear to offer the promise of
avoiding inquiry into religious doctrine, this is sometimes an
illusory promise. Second, reliance on internal governance rules
favors the religious freedom of institutional churches at the
expense of the religious freedom of their constituent elements.
To illustrate the point that deference to internal church
governance rules sometimes may require civil courts to inquire
into religious doctrine, consider the following scenario. It is
familiar history that Henry VIII deposed the Roman Catholic
Church and substituted the Church of England in its stead. The
Church of England came with colonists to America, mostly in the
southern colonies, where it was the officially established church
in Virginia and southwards. With the success of the American
Revolution, Anglicans in America created the ECUSA, though
continued to retain ties with the Archbishop of Canterbury as the,
spiritual head of the worldwide Anglican Communion. Suppose
that units of the ECUSA were to leave that church and affiliate
with the Roman Catholic Church because they have concluded
that the historic split between Rome and Canterbury, and
the subsequent secession of the ECUSA from the Church of
England in the wake of the American Revolution, were each
errors of doctrine." 5 These hypothetical secessionist units of the
ECUSA would acknowledge that the true Christian church is the
Roman Catholic Church, as that church has always contended.
To whose internal hierarchical governance rules should a civil
104See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
105 See, e.g., David Van Biema & Jeff Israely, Could the Pope Aid an Anglican
Split?, TIME, July 9, 2008, available at http://www.time.com/time/world/
article/0,8599,1821374,00.html?imw=Y (discussing a possible schism within the

Anglican Church resulting in units of the Anglican Church rejoining the Roman
Catholic Church).
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court look to decide the resulting property dispute-the ECUSA's
or the Roman Catholic Church's? To add to the problem, suppose
that the internal governance rules of each church provide that
the property of local units is held in trust for the benefit of the
general church.
A glib answer is that the internal governance rules of the
ECUSA should control, but the reason for the dispute is that the
local units proclaim that the true church of which they are a part
is not the ECUSA, but the Roman Catholic Church. The local
units placed title in trust for the benefit of the ECUSA because
they believed it to be the "true" singular hierarchical church
established by Jesus Christ, but they say they now realize that
the true church is the Roman Catholic Church. The local units
note that the general church of which they are a part has always
been "one catholic and apostolic church," as the Nicene Creed of
the ECUSA and the Roman Catholic Church each proclaim;
thus, the entity to which they belong can only be determined by
resolving a disputed issue of religious doctrine. "Nonsense," says
the ECUSA, "the dispute can be resolved by simply examining
the internal governance rules of the ECUSA, which state that the
property of its local units is held in trust for the benefit of
the ECUSA." Literal adherence to internal governance rules
would effectively resolve the doctrinal question in favor of the
ECUSA. But such literal adherence places the civil courts in the
position of answering the doctrinal question in favor of the
Episcopal Church and against the Roman Catholic Church. Of
course, for a civil court to look behind the internal rules would
require the court to answer directly the doctrinal question, an
answer that it cannot provide. In neither case is neutrality
served. In the latter case, civil courts are unequivocally deciding
issues of religious doctrine, but in the former case they are doing
so under the thin coverlet of examining a church's internal
governance rules.
Even resort to neutral principles of formal title is not much
help. Henry VIII seized the Roman Catholic Church's property
and vested it in the Church of England. Post-revolutionary
American Anglicans seized the Church of England's property and
vested it in the ECUSA. If a local Episcopal congregation that
holds its property in trust for the ECUSA should decide that the
true church of which it is a part is the Roman Catholic Church,
though called the Episcopal Church in the title documents,
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reliance on formal title produces an outcome that effectively
resolves the doctrinal question. It is pretense to think that either
internal governance rules or neutral principles truly free the civil
courts from deciding doctrinal issues.
To be sure, there are likely to be instances in which use
of internal governance rules do not require an implicit judicial
decision about doctrine. Such was the case in Gonzalez, Serbian
Orthodox Church, and Kedroff. Matters of internal ecclesiastical
governance are surely the exclusive province of the church,
but when churches splinter into religious factions the dynamic
changes markedly, and the constitutional considerations for
10 6
adjudication of property disputes should reflect those changes.
The basic problem with schisms within a hierarchical church
is that three entities have valid claims of religious freedom. The
institutional church claims that it has the freedom to specify and
perpetuate its dogma by retaining control of the property that
constitutes the local venues for perpetuation of its mission.
Individual members of the institutional church claim the freedom
to reject the church's dogma and think for themselves. If this
were the only conflict, resolution would be simple: The church's
freedom is protected by delivering possession of local church
property to the institutional church and individuals remain free
to walk out of the building and form a new church. But there is
a third element, which knocks this easy resolution into the
gutter. Individuals band together into local communities of
worship. As noted earlier, 7 religious belief usually entails
communal worship and practice, and these local congregations
are often self-financed. To strip the property acquired by local
contributions from the local body that financed and maintained
that property is to deny completely the communal aspect of
religious belief and place civil courts in a partisan role as
defenders of institutional religious orthodoxy. When schism
occurs, reflexive delivery of these properties to the hierarchical
church flatly ignores the profound interest in religious freedom of
the local assembly. Without the buildings and grounds that they
have either purchased or maintained at their own expense, these
16 An illustration of this principle may be found in Dixon v. Edwards, 290 F.3d
699, 718 (4th Cir. 2002) (deferring to a ruling by the diocesan bishop, under the
internal rules of the Episcopal Church, that a local rector was not eligible for the
post).
"07 See supra text accompanying note 58.
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communities will wither and die. Of course, within each local
congregation, the schism that is the root of the problem will
likely be present as well. Under such conditions, something like
the Virginia division statute is the only way to recognize the
equally compelling interests of the hierarchical church and the
local congregations.
It is axiomatic that civil courts cannot use "departure from
doctrine" as a test, but under conditions of schism it is
intellectually dishonest to use a nominally neutral test-whether
internal governance or neutral principles-when the test
effectively privileges one side of a doctrinal division. When
schism occurs, courts are truly neutral as to religious doctrine
when they use a rule that allows local congregations to make
independent judgments on doctrine, rather than automatically
permitting the general church to impose disputed doctrine on
unwilling local communities. Hierarchical churches may object
that this amounts to a civil rejection of a central doctrinal
tenet, but this is not so if the principle is limited to cases where
the hierarchical church has itself divided. When schism has
occurred, the hierarchical church has lost the rationale for
awarding local property to it by reason of deference to internal
governance rules or application of neutral principles of title.
Neither branch of a divided church is entitled to preference from
the civil courts.
Moreover, under Employment Division v. Smith,10 8 a law that
is not a generally applicable rule of conduct, but which in
either purpose or effect singles out religious conduct for
unfavorable treatment, violates the free exercise guarantee.
Judicial deference to the internal governance rules of a
hierarchical church that has divided into competing factions is
not a generally applicable principle. The principle applies only to
churches, in practice applies almost entirely to hierarchical
churches, and is unique in its effects when invoked in the context
of a church schism. Its application in that context singles out the
religious conduct of dissident congregations for unfavorable
treatment. While it may seem that rival claims to church
property do not involve religious conduct, that view is mistaken.
The claim of a congregation to keep the property it has acquired
'0 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990), superseded by Religious Freedom Restoration
Act ("RFRA") of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006).
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and maintained by expenditure of its own funds to preserve its
community of religious fellowship is at the heart of the religious
conduct of the community.
B.

Special Statutes

State autonomy to craft special statutes to deal with church
property disputes is more apparent than real. Such statutes
cannot require judicial resolution of doctrinal matters, afford
special benefits to churches that are not offered equally to
secular charities to attain some secular objective, or privilege
some churches at the expense of others. Moreover, statutory
approaches must respect the free exercise freedoms of individuals
gathered in local worship communities. These principles reduce
considerably the choices open to legislatures in crafting such
statutes. California's statutory grant of special privileges to
hierarchical churches is a good example of a statute that fails
these principles. 10 9 So, too, is Pennsylvania's version of this
approach, which mandates that civil courts defer to internal
governance rules of a church in adjudicating property disputes,
and which also stipulates that all property acquired by units of a
hierarchical church shall be under the control of the ruling
officers and authorities of the institutional church. 110 To be sure,
application of such statutes to local units of a hierarchical church
that have voluntarily agreed to hold their property in trust for
the general church are not constitutionally problematic."' But
when such statutes enable hierarchical churches to impress
a trust upon local congregational property without explicit
agreement to the trust on the part of the local congregation, the
Establishment Clause is violated.
In addition, regardless of the form of ownership of local
congregational property, when a hierarchical church fractures
over issues of doctrine, there is no longer any rationale for
exclusive reliance upon internal governance rules, and statutes
that compel such reliance under conditions of schism become
vulnerable to claims that their application deprives local
congregations of their religious freedom and that they constitute
a forbidden establishment of religion. Under such circumstances,
any special statutory approach must recognize the free exercise
109

See supra Part III.

110See 10 PA. CONS. STAT. § 81 (1999).
"1 See, e.g, In re Church of St. James the Less, 888 A.2d 795, 807-08 (Pa. 2005).
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claims of local congregations as well as the interest in religious
autonomy asserted by a hierarchical church." 2 The Virginia
division statute is an excellent example of a special statute that
validly addresses the particular problem of churches in the
1 3
throes of doctrinal schism.
C. Neutral Principles

While the neutral principles approach is generally a reliable
method of dealing with property issues amid church schisms,
problems can exist in its application. Religious issues can be
embedded in titles. Thus, for example, if property is transferred
in trust to "the Episcopal Bishop of Pittsburgh," neutral
principles cannot possibly resolve the matter. Because there are
now two Episcopal Bishops of Pittsburgh-one the leader of the
existing Episcopal Diocese that has voted to affiliate with the
Anglican Church of North America, and the other the cleric
installed by the ECUSA to assume the role of Bishop of
Pittsburgh-a civil court applying neutral principles must
determine which of these entities is the "Episcopal Bishop of
Pittsburgh." Alternatively, a civil court could inquire into
the intent of the transferor.
That inquiry would involve
determination of the donor's preferences in the schism, but would
not require a resolution of the ecclesiastical dispute concerning
which cleric is the Episcopal Bishop of Pittsburgh. Rather, a civil
court might simply determine which Episcopal Bishop the donor
intended to benefit, unless the answer to that question required a
resolution of doctrinal differences.
An additional problem in the case of hierarchical churches
is that neutral principles become intertwined with deference to
internal church governance. The most common situation is
presented when a hierarchical church includes in its governing
instruments a declaration that local congregational property is
held for the benefit of the general church. Even without any
action on the part of a local congregation to create such a trust,
courts frequently find an implied trust in favor of the general
church based on local congregational acceptance of clergy
provided through the general church, the use of the hierarchical
112 Of course, once a hierarchical church has divided, its interest in religious
autonomy no longer extends to imposing its will upon all elements of a divided
church.
11.

See supra Part II.
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church's name, or other evidence suggestive of local acquiescence
to the rules of the hierarchical church.114 To the extent that
these factors are applied with equal vigor to secular charitable
entities, this may be a pure application of neutral principles.
However, if a hierarchical church's declaration that local
congregations hold property in trust for the general church is the
critical element in a finding of implied trust, and secular entities
are not permitted to impose trusts in their favor by such
unilateral action, an Establishment Clause violation is the result.
CONCLUSION

When the Supreme Court decided Watson and adopted
deference to internal church governance as a standard for
resolution of church property disputes, the religion clauses did
not apply to the states. While the Court couched its reliance
upon internal governance as an implication flowing from the
ideals of religious freedom, it did not have to examine that
premise critically. Deference to internal governance rules of
hierarchical churches promotes religious freedom sometimes, but
not always.
Civil judicial interference with a hierarchical
church's control of its clergy is the paradigmatic case of
impermissible interference with the free exercise of religion. By
contrast, permitting a hierarchical church unilaterally to impose
trusts in its favor upon property held for the benefit of local
congregations either creates an Establishment Clause violationif secular charitable entities are denied this state-created benefit
or if there is no plausible secular purpose for this benefit--or cuts
deeply into the practical reality of how individual believers
gathered in local communities manifest their religious conduct.
This problem is exacerbated when a hierarchical church divides
amid doctrinal disagreement. At that point, courts should apply
a rule of local option, permitting each congregation to decide for
itself which branch of the divided church will have its fealty and
its property. Only by applying such a rule can a proper balance
be struck between the splintered autonomy interest of a
hierarchical church and the interest in religious associational
freedom of local congregations and their individual members.
The reflexive reliance of courts upon internal governance rules to

I" See, e.g., Church of St. James, 888 A.2d at 809.
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decide property issues amid schism has obscured the interests in
religious freedom that are at stake.
Adoption of the local option principle leaves hierarchical
churches with many avenues to secure local property for the
benefit of the general church. First, they can avoid rupture by
finding sufficient common ground in their religious doctrine to
accommodate their bodies of believers. Second, they can insist
that local congregations explicitly place their properties in trust
for the benefit of the general church as the price of continued
affiliation with the general church. What they cannot do is
create such trusts by the ipse dixit of the hierarchical church.

